Organisatsioonide valdkonnas on võimu küsimused ikka olnud ühed sellised, mis on küll olulised, kuid mille mõtestamiseks sageli puuduvad teadmised või julgus. Tihti piirdutakse tsentraliseerituse-detsentraliseerituse retoorikaga nendele detailsemat sisu andmata. Siinviidatu on vabalevis olev tekst, kus autorite huvi on sihistatud nii töötajate iseotsustamisele kui organisatsiooni disainile.
A large body of management research focuses on the ways that organization design influences firms’ behavior and performance (Chandler, 1962; Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004; Mintzberg, 1979; Puranam, 2018). This literature has explored the tradeoffs between the strict control of centralized hierarchies and the empowering freedom of autonomous forms of organization. One of the key goals of this literature has been to identify the conditions that make a specific form more suitable than its alternatives (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Miles & Snow, 2003; Mintzberg, 1979).
Autorid seavad fookust:
We examine two canonical approaches: (a) self-selection, in which the employees individually evaluate and self-allocate to projects; and (b) centralized allocation, in which a single manager (superior) evaluates opportunities and allocates employees (subordinates) to selected projects.
One such form, which has increasingly become prominent and has captured the attention of the organization design community, is a “bossless” organization where identification and evaluation of promising opportunities and allocation of employees to those tasks are left to the employees themselves (Foss & Dobrajska, 2015; Puranam, Alexy, & Reitzig, 2014; Puranam & Håkonsson, 2015). Boss-less organizations are a canonical example of self-selection, where employees initiate tasks and allocate responsibility to themselves without the direct interference of a manager (Lee & Edmondson, 2017).
Küsimused, mis võiks huvi pakkuda:
Why and under what conditions does self-selection perform better than hierarchical allocation? What are the mechanisms that give self-selection its edge and what are its boundary conditions? Why do organizations that use and vigorously promote self-selection, like GitHub or Oticon, subsequently abandon it? Why is self-selection seemingly so difficult to scale and how can organization designers address some of the shortcomings of self-selection through directed interventions?
Strateegia ja organisatsiooni struktuur:
Strategy can be conceptualized as a set of decisions that include resource allocations that channel a firm’s limited resources, both material and nonmaterial, toward value-creating activities (Bower, 1970; Levinthal, 2017). Management scholars have seen organizational structure as an important lever in managing allocation process and thus helping to shape a firm’s strategy (Chandler, 1962; Henderson & Clark, 1990).
Iseorganiseeruvate organisatsioonide suunas:
Daft and Lewin (1993, p. iv) identified a specific organizational form—the “self-organizing organization”—that allows employees to make strategic and tactical decisions at all levels of an organization’s hierarchy.
Marschak and Radner’s (1972) economic theory of teams was one of the first attempts to develop a formal model of organizational decision making with a focus on information processing in hierarchies. Building on their work, Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1988) advanced a formal model of polyarchies and hierarchies composed of individuals who evaluate incoming projects using their own private estimates. They examined how organizational structure determines the number of omission errors (failing to select a value-positive project) and commission errors (selecting a value-negative project) produced by each form, finding that polyarchies (flat, decentralized organizations) produced more errors of commission, whereas vertical hierarchies committed more errors of omission.
Kasulik analüütiline eristus:
Consequently, we have three types of projects: (a) optimal (value-positive and should be undertaken), (b) value-positive but not optimal (should not be undertaken given resource constraints), and (c) value-negative (should never be undertaken).
Examining the results of an agent-based model, we demonstrate that self-selection performs better when a company is understaffed with respect to the projects it can pursue. Centralized allocation, on the other hand, allows organizations to avoid overcrowding when opportunities are few.
Ketkar, H., & Workiewicz, M. (2021) Power To The People: The Benefits And Limits Of Employee Self‐Selection In Organizations. Strategic Management Journal