Alustuseks lugemissoovitus: kes on huvitet midagi teada saama politsei kohta Prantsusmaal, siis siinviidatud artikli autor on üks neist, kelle tekste tasub lugeda.
Strateegilise juhtimise valdkond pakub hulgaliselt teadmisi organisatsiooni ja strateegiate kohta ning nende kahe seoste mõistmise vajalikkuse üle on vaidlused suuresti peetud. Ometi on neid ((politsei)organisatsioone), kes on otsustanud neid tõsiasju eirata. Sestap on ikka huvitav, kui keegi mõtleb-kirjutab politseistrateegiatest.

Konteksti avamisel võib leida järgmist:

What we would like to emphasize is how difficult it is, within these forces, to shift operational paradigms even when they clearly appear inadequate to deal with a situation that, for all its novelty, was maybe not totally unforeseeable. […] From a purely rational perspective, neither the astonishing degree of violence nor the radical criticism directed at the policing apparatus – which years of repressive policies had endowed with extra human, material, and legal resources – have brought about any change of policy. As we will see, old habits die hard within policing organizations. […] The policing world is not a coherent whole: seen from within, the force is just fragmented system, full of tensions, especially between the top of the pyramid and field practitioners.

Nicolas Paul Stéphane Sarközy de Nagy-Bocsa tegevused politseivaldkonnas nii siseministri kui presidendina on leidnud elavat arvustamist (siit võib leida mõndagi). Ka siin artiklis ei minda sellest mööda:

Structurally speaking, then President Sarkozy and his circle decided to further centralize the force by merging two major entities in 2008: the Direction Ge´ne´rale des Renseignements Ge´ne´raux (DCRG, hereafter ‘RG’), in charge of monitoring socially deprived areas and potential civil unrest, and the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), […] The merger was intended to improve coordination between two organizations with contrasting work cultures: […] To many, it looked suspiciously as a political police serving the President.

Artikli üks peatükk on pealkirjastatud järgmiselt: “The instrumentalization of police forces by political authorities”. Ja sealt võib leida muuhulgas:

As for the police, their position was a most uncomfortable one: not only did they have to protect terrorismsensitive sites, but also handle demonstrations that were considered high-risk – both for protesters, who might simply be attacked by gunmen again, and for the government who would be held responsible. Frontline police practitioners found it hard to adjust, torn as they were between the need to look after these movements […] They ended up over-reacting, charging at quiet processions, using so-called non-lethal weapons against peaceful protesters, thus triggering violent reactions.

Mõned järeldused:

First, however defective the highly centralized nature of national-level decision-making and public safety management has been shown to be in the aforementioned situations, it remains the norm for all policies in this domain. […] Second – and related -insight: frontline police still get very little trust and autonomy in emergency situations, as their management’s main goal is to keep reactions ‘in check’ as much – and centrally – as possible. […] Charlie Hebdo is a case in point: in spite of all the shortcomings exposed by the attack, the force did not suffer any loss of popularity – quite the opposite happened, actually. […] Generally speaking, the 2015 attacks and massive 2016 protests have pushed the force toward increased self-withdrawal rather than a reflection on their place in society.

Mouhanna, C. (2021). Reforms and Unexpected Events: The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Policing Strategies. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice.