Siinviidatu on nüüd küll selline tekst, mis vist tavaloogikate kohaselt – mis need küll on? – ei sobitu ühegi siinse kodulehe teemaga. Minule aga tundub, et see tekst sobib kõigi teemadega, olgu siis tegemist ükskõik, mis valdkonnaga sotsiaalteadustes.
It is widely admitted – in the post-logical positivism era – that major scientific changes consist in conceptual ruptures. This means that novel scientific theories are conceptually incompatible or even incommensurable (Feyerabend 1962; Kuhn 1996) with regard to older ones.
Autor seab eesmärgi:
In this paper, I will discuss the problem of scientific change as an explanatory problem, that is, as a philosophical problem concerning what logical forms of explanation we can – and should – employ in order to make those belief modifications which amount to scientific change intelligible. […] My aim is to show that treating the problem of scientific change as an explanatory problem, and as part of the contemporary debate about naturalism, can shed light on the roots of different philosophical issues concerning scientific belief modification.
Oluline täpsustus lugemishuvi suurendamiseks:
My aim is to examine which are the appropriate kind(s) of explanations in order to understand scientific belief modification. Within this context the term “understanding” has nothing to do with any particular sense of understanding. In particular, it has nothing to do with the Hermeneutic notion of Verstehen. It is also not to be equated with scientific understanding.
Normatiivse ja analüütilis-empiirilise vahekorra avamine:
Normative and empirical-scientific explanations can both be used in order to make epistemic attitudes intelligible. Empirical-scientific explanations make belief modifications intelligible by placing it into the causal 12 order described by one or more empirical sciences (see Forman 1971). Normative explanations, on the other hand, make belief modifications intelligible by showing how they conform to one or more epistemic norms (see Lakatos 1978a, 68).
… ja erisus:
I just want to point out the difference in the logical form between the normative and the empirical-scientific explanations: the latter are based on a presumed causal order which always needs to fit the episodes of actual belief modification, while the former are based on epistemic norms which, as far as they are presumed valid or correct, determine the epistemic content to which the episodes of actual belief modification should be adjusted.
One may think that the liberal naturalist conception of scientific change I propose looks like a disguised version of Hermeneutics. After all, what I am suggesting is that we need a rational story of the observed epistemic events.
Dimitrakos, T. (2021). The Source of Epistemic Normativity: Scientific Change as an Explanatory Problem. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 51(5), 469–506. https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393120987901