Siinviidatud võib esmapilgul tunduda siinsel lehel võõrkehana. Omati märkab lugeja, et populism on midagi, mis ei kuulu ainult poliitikateoreetikute omavahelistesse vestlustesse, vaid puudutab väga paljusid igapäevapraktikate tasandil. Sestap võib see lugu huvi pakkuda väga suurele hulgale, kuid eriti kasulik oleks lugeda nii juhtidel, poliitikakujundajatel kui ka turvalisuskorraldajatel. Ainuüksi küsimused välistamisest, hegemooniast ja võimusuhetest/tehnikatest, on väärt lugemist, mõtlemist, arutamist.
There is something “populist” about every political order. This is so because populism, rightly understood, constructs the object it claims to represent, namely the people.
Küsimus on ikka ja alati võimusuhetes:
To do so, she argues, is to acknowledge “that there is no ultimate foundation,” and that, as a result, any order should be understood as “a particular conﬁguration of power relations” (Errejón and Mouffe 2016, 19–20; also Mouffe 2018, 88).
Kes on patust puhas?
Nevertheless, it remains the case that, for Laclau and Mouffe, any orderincluding an agonistic democracy—is marked by antagonisms (i.e., exclusions) that cannot be justiﬁed with reference to a yardstick independent of the hegemonic articulation of that order. This is what they refer to as “the political” constitution of the social (Mouffe 2018, 38).
Foundations are, ultimately, the crystallizations of relations of power.
Kuidas mõelda demokraatiast?
Appropriating Claude Lefort, Müller argues that we should think of democracy as a process where different representations of the people—put forward by competing political parties— vie to occupy the empty place of power (Müller 2017c, 71; Lefort 1986).
Populismist … otse:
Populist movements “colonize,” “occupy,” and “usurp” the state, thus closing the gap between the place of power and a particular image of the people (Müller 2017b, 71, 78, 80).
Kas vaidleme mängureeglite või mängu üle?
The problem with populism is that, rather than having political conﬂicts—democratic competition—within the constitutional framework, we have political conﬂicts over the constitutional framework; rather than merely facilitating the competition between different parties, the populist constitution is itself partisan.
Left populism implies “the creation of a popular majority to come to power and establish a progressive hegemony” (Mouffe 2018, 50, also 45). Whether a radical and plural democracy or a left populist hegemony, “any political order is the expression of a hegemony, of a speciﬁc pattern of power relations” (Mouffe 2000, 99; see also 104; 2018, 46).
Demokraatia ja meie ja nemad …
Mouffe draws on Carl Schmitt: there is no democracy without a people (a “we”), and so there is no democracy without exclusion (a “they”).
Ikka huvid, ei mingit neutraalsust:
For Mouffe, liberty and equality “only exist inscribed in different hegemonic formations” (Mouffe 2018, 43). This means that her “agonistic perspective takes account of the fact that every social order is politically instituted and that the ground on which hegemonic interventions occur is never neutral, for it is always the product of previous hegemonic practices” (Mouffe 2018, 92–93).
Put differently, there is something “populist” about every constitutional order.
Thomassen, L. (2022). The “populist” foundation of liberal democracy: Jan-Werner Müller, Chantal Mouffe, and post-foundationalism. Philosophy & Social Criticism. https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537211066860