Siin üks tekst sellest, missugused võivad olla järelmid-käitumismustrid organisatsioonides siis, kui vahetub poliitiline võim ja senised korrumpeerunud ametnikud. Paljud organisatsioonid on seotud avaliku sektoriga väga erinevatest huvidest ja eesmärkidest lähtudes. Viimaste realiseerimiseks on ametnike “määrimine” üks võimalustest, kuid mida see võib tähendada siis, kui toimuvad muudatused ja ametnikud vahetuvad?

Kontekstiks:

Firms commonly leverage political connections—defined as personal ties between their upper echelons and public officials (Faccio, 2006; Fisman, 2001)—to manage their relationships with the government. […] recent studies have unveiled the “dark side” of political connections, such that firms can be harmed by their connections with officials who lose political struggles or who are guilty of misconduct […] a firm that has strong associations with ousted corrupt officials will be less capable of building new connections with the successors of those officials, because the successors will try to distance themselves from organizations that have been deeply tied to their discredited predecessors.

Hüpotees:

we hypothesize that when a firm is closely associated with ousted corrupt officials, it is more inclined to remove its existing connections with these officials to dissociate from the source of stigma.

Rajasõltuslikkus organisatsiooni ja poliitiliste muutustega seotud ametnike suhetes:

The network literature notes that a key manifestation of firms’ network embeddedness is the nature of structural path dependence in firms’ effort to adapt their relationships and networks

Artikli panus:

By drawing on the network embeddedness perspective to highlight the path-dependent mechanisms behind the potential discrepancies between firms’ motivations and capabilities to adapt their political connections, our theoretical framework contributes to corporate political strategy literature by providing novel insights into the theoretical void about the evolution of political connections.

Mõned järeldused:

The graph shows that after anticorruption shocks, firms with high-level government dependence are even more likely to be motivated by their associations with ousted corrupt officials to drop these tainted political connections than firms with low-level governance dependence […] These results show that, after anticorruption shocks, firms associated with ousted corrupt officials of stronger political power are more likely to be motivated to remove their tainted political connections

Jiang, H., Jia, N., Bai, T., & Bruton, G. D. (2021) CLEANING HOUSE BEFORE HOSTING NEW GUESTS: A POLITICAL PATH DEPENDENCE MODEL OF POLITICAL CONNECTION ADAPTATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF ANTICORRUPTION SHOCKS. Strategic Management Journal.