Vahelduseks üks tekst, mille sisu on puutumuses kõikide siinse lehe fookusvaldkondadega ning ületab neid kõiki. Lugemiseks võiks veidi aega varuda, sest paljudele võib stiil ja mõttekäigud tunduda harjumatud, kuid näited ja ladus esitus võimaldavad kiiret sisseelamist ning muudavad tekstist “väljatuleku” keeruliseks, see haarab endasse.

Kontekstiks:

Until relatively recently, the distinction between non-moral and moral was often expressed as the distinction between facts and values. But as John Benson pointed out to me, if moral claims are objectively true or false, then they too are factual claims about what ought to be done.

Autor väidab:

I argue in this article that non-moral statements entail moral ones, which latter are objectively true or false, and indeed that they must entail them.

Sõltuvuslikkusest:

All empirical non-moral and all universal moral assertions are contingently true or false, depending on the world we live in – even moral ones, as I shall explain later.

Levinud arvamustest:

Many people think that what they are doing is right without even considering that it obviously conflicts with what they preach.

Lugemishuvi suurendamiseks:

Finally, I should perhaps again emphasize that various people might indeed believe that particular non-moral truths entail particular moral conclusions when they do not, or reject an entailment when it does hold.

Lyon, A. (2022) Why ‘Is’ Must Entail ‘Ought’. Philosophical Investigations.