Bent Flyvbjerg on üks neist autoritest, kelle tekstide ilmumist ootan ikka suure huviga. Siinviidatu vabalevist olev teksti leidis oma koha siiski põhjusel, et tegeleb küsimusega, mis võiks huvi pakkuda kõikidele inimestele, mitte ainult organisatsioonide või projektijuhtimise väljal tegutsejatele. Põhjus on väga lihtne: on raske ette kujutada elu väljaspool “projekte”, st suur osa paljude inimeste igapäevaelust ongi seotud projektidega, olgugi, et erinevaid kindla perioodiga ja eesmärgiga piiritletud tegevusi ei pruugita projektiks nimetada. Samuti on raske ette kujutada, et kedagi ei huvita eksimisvõimalused otsustamisel või valikute langetamisel. Niisiis, head lugemist.

Kontekstiks:

Since the early work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974), the number of biases identified by behavioral scientists has exploded in what has been termed a behavioral revolution in economics, management, and across the social and human sciences. Today, Wikipedia’s list of cognitive biases contains more than 200 items (“List of cognitive biases,” 2021).

Kõik käitumisega seotud võimalikud kõrvalekalded otsustamisel ei pruugi olla seotud kognitiivsete aspektidega.

Many would agree with Kahneman (2011, p. 255) that optimism bias “may well be the most significant of the cognitive biases.” However, behavioral biases are not limited to cognitive biases, though behavioral scientists, and especially behavioral economists, often seem to think so.

Järjest huvitavamaks läheb:

Political bias—understood as deliberate strategic distortions —arises from power relations, instead of from cognition, and has long been the object of study in political economy. […] In fact, for very large projectsso-called megaprojects—the most significant behavioral bias is arguably political bias, more specifically, strategic misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Flyvbjerg et al., 2018; Wachs, 2013).

Üks probleem, kaks perspektiivi (tudengid, siin on koht õppimiseks teoreetilise lähtekohast!):

The editor explained to me that he saw Kahneman and me as explaining the same phenomena—cost overruns, delays, and benefit shortfalls in investment decisions—but with fundamentally different theories. As a psychologist, Kahneman explained outcomes in terms of cognitive bias, especially optimism bias and the planning fallacy. As an economic geographer, I explained the same phenomena in terms of political economic bias, specifically strategic misrepresentation. So which of the two theories is right, asked the HBR editor?

Peenhäälestus:

When Kahneman and I compared notes again, we agreed the balanced position regarding real-world decision-making is that both cognitive and political biases influence outcomes. Sometimes one dominates, sometimes the other, depending on what the stakes are and the degree of political-organizational pressures on individuals.

Vihje ühele retseptile:

More importantly, however, in our discussions and in a relatively obscure article by Kahneman and Tversky (1979a), I found an idea for how to eliminate or reduce both cognitive and political biases in decision-making. I developed this into a practical tool called “reference class forecasting” (Flyvbjerg, 2006).

Lugemishuvi ei ole vist tarvis enam suurendada, kuid kokkuvõtteks midagi siiski:

In behavioral terms, the causal chain starts with human bias (political and cognitive), which leads to underestimation of scope during planning, which leads to unaccounted for scope changes during delivery, which leads to cost overrun. […] Behavioral science tells project planners and managers, “Your biggest risk is you.”

Flyvbjerg, B. (2021). Top Ten Behavioral Biases in Project Management: An OverviewProject Management Journal52(6), 531-546.