Artikli pealkiri on küll “kuidas mõista sõda Ukrainas”, kuid igapäevaselt, inimesele kel raske mõista vägivalda üldisemalt, võib pealkiri tähenda ka näiteks “kuidas mõista mõistetamatut”. Teksti tasub lugeda kõikidel, kel veidigi huvi analüütilisele perspektiivile sõjast Ukrainas. Siinviidatu keskendub argumentatsioonis juhtimisvaldkonna argumentatsioonile.

Kontekstiks:

“Like any complex phenomenon, war decisions can be (and have been) explained through different lenses in different disciplines. As I am writing this commentary for the British Journal of Management, I position my observations and arguments in the management discipline. The lens I apply is escalation of commitment.” (Michailova, 2022, p. 1)

Lumepalliefekt. Või ka näiteks bürokraatia. Zygmunt Bauman kirjutab raamatus Modernity and the Holocaust muuhulgas: “But bureaucracy made the Holocaust. […]Bureaucracy contributed to the perpetuation of the Holocaust not only through its inherent capacities and skills, but also through its immanent ailments. The tendency of all bureaucracies to lose sight of the original goal and to concentrate on the means instead – the means which turn into the ends – has been widely noted, analysed and described.”

“In other words, the term describes situations where a decision is made to continue to invest, despite evidence suggesting the investment is unjustified or unwise.” (Michailova, 2022, p. 2)

Argitraagikas on see, mõistmise seisukohast keskne tähelepanek, jäänud üsna varju.

“To understand what we often find and declare not understandable and/or unimaginable, we need to consider that the current war (like any other war) has not emerged in a vacuum.” (Michailova, 2022, p. 2)

See võiks küll lugemishuvi äratada

“The next section summarizes very briefly the last 100+ years in an attempt to illustrate how escalation of commitment evolved in the RussiaUkraine relationship.” (Michailova, 2022, p. 2)

Esilekutsutud näljahäda.

“The years 1932–1933 were marked by a catastrophic manmade Ukrainian famine (known as the Holodomor), resulting in almost four million Ukrainian deaths. This demographic tragedy was engineered by Stalin’s policies of forced agricultural collectivization and a desire to turn the Soviet Union into a global superpower.” (Michailova, 2022, p. 2)

Oluline kõne ja sattumuslikkus.

“On 8 December 1991, Stanislav Shushkevich (then at the helm of the Soviet Republic of Belarus) made a highsecurity phone call to Mikhail Gorbachev (whose mother tongue was Ukrainian and who appointed Shushkevich in the first place), telling his leader that the Union was over. The Union was, indeed, gone – both as a structural and political configuration and as a term.” (Michailova, 2022, p. 3)

Omanditunne.

“It was painful for Russia to lose Crimea and Ukraine in broader terms in 1991. Giving up 13 Soviet republics and 35% of their territory must surely have hurt, but losing Ukraine – which has for centuries been indispensable to Russia’s existence as a great empire – was an entirely different matter. Russian pain was sharp and difficult to bear.” (Michailova, 2022, p. 3)

Vildakad eeldused ja eksimused juhatavad suurema julmuse, mitte mõistmiseni.

“As Mearsheimer, whom I cited above, argues: ‘Mr Putin may have misjudged Russia’s military capabilities, the effectiveness of the Ukrainian resistance and the scope and speed of the Western response, but one should never underestimate how ruthless great powers can be when they believe they are in dire straits’.” (Michailova, 2022, p. 4)

Michailova, S. (2022). An Attempt to Understand the War in Ukraine–An Escalation of Commitment Perspective. British Journal of Management. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12633