Eesti avalikus sektoris leidub mitmeid organisatsioone, kus töötaja panust hinnatakse kuivade formaalsete mõõdikute alusel heal juhul kord aastas ning töötaja-ülemuse kohtumised toimuvad formaalselt ja ehk mõned korrad aastas, sh kõrgemate ülemustega töötaja kokku ei puutugi. Ei saa siiski välistada, et on organisatsioone või juhtimise eest töötasu vastuvõtjaid, kes on huvitet organisatsiooni või üksuse arengust ka indiviidi perspektiivist, sh soovides igale üksikule töötajale arenguks sooduskeskkonda luua. Seetõttu siinviidatud vabalevis olev strateegilise juhtimise erialane tekst oma koha leidiski.


Strategy researchers increasingly seek to understand how firms can successfully aggregate the knowledge, skills, and abilities of individual employees into team- and firm-level resources that contribute to competitive advantage (Kryscynski, Coff, & Campbell, 2021; Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011). […] As Coff (1997) emphasizes, the difficulty of discerning employees’ individual contribution to group-level output extends beyond rivals, to the focal firm itself (see also Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 2008; Huckman & Pisano, 2006). Alchian and Demsetz (1972) refer to the challenge of measuring individual contributions to group-level output as the “performance non-separability problem.”

Jääb mulje, et töötajate panuse hindamine ei ole lihtne ülesanne

The vast literature in organizational psychology about performance evaluations explicitly avoids theorizing about how supervisors might arrive at performance ratings in a team production context. For example, Levy and Williams’ (2004, p. 894) influential review states that “[u]nfortunately, while a good bit of work has been conducted on the metrics involved in team performance measurement, very little empirical work has been conducted regarding how to develop and implement appraisals in this context despite the great influx of team-based work environments.”

Autorid lubavad ja väidavad:

In this paper, we seek to make initial progress toward an understanding of how managers perform subjective performance evaluations when they lack clear measures of individual productivity because employees produce output in teams. […] We argue that fluctuations in team membership facilitate supervisors’ subjective performance evaluations, because supervisors accumulate information about the covariance between a worker’s presence on the team and the team’s output.

Üks stiil, erinevad vaated

The most famous example might be Steve Jobs. Supporters of Jobs often note how Apple improved when he returned to the company in 1996 (e.g. Weinberger & Hartmans, 2020), while detractors note that the company performed poorly under his leadership in the early 1980s (e.g. Uttal, 1985).


We suggest that managers might glean information from fluctuations in team membership to inform their opinions about individual workers’ contributions to team production. We model supervisors’ inferences using standard techniques for estimating individual productivity from data on collectively generated output (Azoulay et al., 2010; Chen & Garg, 2018; Oettl, 2012; Stuart, 2017). In total, the theory and results suggest that fluctuations in team membership and output may generate useful information for supervisors who must evaluate workers’ individual performance.

Lugemishuvi suurendamiseks:

Finally, we want to highlight the managerial implications of this paper. First, the paper suggests that particular firm policies and structures might help the firm to better assess individual contributions to team production. […] Second, the paper suggests that managers might incur influence costs and agency costs from employees who seek to manage perceptions of their inferred productivity.

Uribe, J., Carnahan, S., Meluso, J., & Austin‐Breneman, J. (2022) How Do Managers Evaluate Individual Contributions to Team Production? A Theory and Empirical Test. Strategic Management Journal.