Hierarhia on üks ühiskonna mõtestamise ideaalmudelitest, mis küll sageli on (retoorilise) väljenduse leidnud organisatsioonides. Hierarhiate mõtestamise-mõistmise tähendusruumi avardamiseks siin üks vaatenurk sotsioloogia ajakirjast.
Konteksti avamisel märgib autor muuhulgas:
Marion Fourcade’s “Ordinal Citizenship” is the brilliant diagnosis of a new development of market society, wherein the ideal of a rank-free society of equals, which used to come as a promise of free markets, is now being crushed by the very logic upon which markets operate. […] Fourcade’s key insight comes from unpacking the moral implications of this technical shift: because modern classifications seem to rest on nothing but behavioral information, positions within them are increasingly experienced as morally deserved – the outcome of prior good or bad individual actions and decisions. Algorithmic forms of classifications, therefore, recreate their own hierarchies of moral standing, and data-powered markets, far from ushering in a “free society of equals,” have become machines to stratify individuals by degrees of greater or lesser
I want to highlight a different pathway whereby algorithmic classification undermines ideals of equality and threatens to restore aristocratic-like forms of social stratification.
Kaks perspektiivi kodanikuks olemise mõtestamisel:
There are two broad ways one can think of citizenship. As a set of rights warranting individuals’ inclusion into a community of peer citizens, first. This view, which is the one Fourcade adopts, regards citizens as the depositories of citizenship, as those upon which it is bestowed. Yet citizenship is not just a form of social standing associated with a series of rights and prerogatives. Another way of thinking about it is as a form of civic behavior – as one’s mindfulness of collective affairs. This is the definition we have in mind when we praise a colleague for their citizenship in the workplace, for example. Citizens in this second view are the sources of citizenship, they are the ones volunteering it, the ones in whom it originates.
I am arguing that algorithmic techniques of classification, when applied to sorting people by degrees of risk, creditworthiness, or performance, do more than one thing. On the one hand, they create orderingshierarchical sortings which, because they appear to be rooted in nothing but individuals’ purposefulness and agency, can pass for legitimate hierarchies reflecting these individuals’ unequal moral worth. Yet these techniques also do something else – something that appears in plain sight if we look at their outputs as aesthetic objects: by vacuuming up the fuzziness and ambiguity inherent to the empirical data they base themselves upon, they inject artificial orderliness into the way the world appears to outside observers. […] By producing clear-cut hierarchies, then, algorithmic forms of classification do more than presenting positions in these hierarchies as deserved and therefore as legitimate. They also subtly assert that it is warranted to sort people into hierarchies of worthiness in the first place – that there is such a thing as a meaningful hierarchy of merit, of risk, or of creditworthiness. To put it in aesthetic terms, they cultivate a hierarchical gaze in the eyes of those experiencing the world through the sortings that they create.
Accominotti, F. (2021). The aesthetics of hierarchy. The British Journal of Sociology.