Theoretical Criminology veebruarinumbris taasilmus esmalt 2020. a ilmavalgust näinud tekst Friedrich Nietzsche Moraali genealoogiast panusest kaasaegse kriminoloogia ja eeskätt karistamise mõistmiseks. Kuna tekstis põhiküsimused on praegu – vägivallalaine, sanktsioonid, piirangud – erakordselt aktuaalsed, siis oleks lausa vastutustundetu sellel mitte peatuda. Lisaks on minule jäänud mulje – loodetavasti ekslikult -, et karistaja naudingu olulisus karistamisel on märkimisväärne (st karistamine kui võimumehhanism). Karistaja all pean siin silmas kõiksugu sanktsioonide kehtestajaid ja rakendajaid. Lisaks kõikidele inimestele üldiselt, võiks see tekst huvi pakkuda politseinikele ja politseihariduse korraldajatele, sest filosoofia kursuse puudumine näiteks magistriõppekavast … ei jää tagajärgedeta (neid võimalikke tagajärgi võib avalikus ruumis piisavalt kohata).

Allnevalt esitan vaid mõned vihjed, sest tekstis leidis allajoonimist pea kogu tekstikorpus. Niisiis, tasub aega võtta ja nautida.

Kontekstiks:

Nietzsche’s writings help illuminate the political-religious-moral programme of penology and the far from innocuous nature of the moral entrepreneurship that grounded penal reform.

Autori ambitsioon:

This article explores On the Genealogy of Morals (Nietzsche, 1998/1887) 2 and articulates its import to criminology, especially penology. As it will argue, this text is indispensable to understanding the history of the production of punishment as an important value to/ of society—what can be called a “value of values” (Acampora, 2019: 225; emphasis omitted)—and the processes that undergird this production.

Neile, kes ei ole arutluse all oleva tekstiga tuttav (eestikeelne on läbimüüdud, kuid nt Amazonist võib leida Kindle versiooni mõnekümne sendiga):

On the Genealogy of Morals “is now recognized as a masterpiece” (Laforce, 2019: 292), thought to be Nietzsche’s “most important and systematic work” and considered “one of the key texts of European intellectual modernity” (Pearson, 2006: 16).

Genealoogiast:

In other words, “what is distinctive about Nietzsche’s enterprise” is that his “genealogy is a new method of applying historical investigation to philosophical concerns” (Hill, 2003: 203), in this case attending to the fundamental question about being and becoming: “‘How did I come to feel and think in these ways of mine’” (Janaway, 2006: 347; emphasis in original)?

Lähtekohad mõistmiseks:

Two important matters from this complex summation of Nietzsche’s key ideas need highlighting. First, man becomes a calculating being. Second, and relatedly, this also means that man is a calculable being.

Väga kaasaegne … ja valus:

This is because “the most powerful aid to memory was pain” (Nietzsche, 1998/1887: 43; emphasis added). Nietzsche (1998/1887: 42) writes that: “Things never proceeded without blood, torture, and victims, when man thought it necessary to forge a memory for himself ”.

Kuulekate kehade loomine – väärtuste ja valu seosed:

Foucault (1995/1977: 136) describes how humans are turned into governable subjects through “projects of docility” which were specifically designed to imprint upon individuals the mandate of the state. In other words, and to return to Nietzsche, it is only possible to create docile beings because actors are rational, but this rationality is produced and harnessed via pain, which punishment formalizes under a moral code.

Võlgniku ja võlausaldaja suhe:

According to Nietzsche (1998/1887: 52), the community’s relationship with its members is akin to that between the creditor (the community) and debtor (members of the community). […] Alluding to the precepts of the social contract (e.g. Hobbes, 1985/1651), Nietzsche (1998/1887: 52; emphasis in original) writes that “the criminal is above all [. . .] someone who breaks a contractual commitment [. . .] towards the whole community”.

Nii vist kujunevadki vaenlased … naudingu kaudu:

“punishment” is simply the image [. . .] of normal behaviour towards a hated enemy, who lies prostrate and defenceless, bereft not only of every right and protection, but also of all hope of grace. Punishment is, then, the prerogative of the victor and celebration [. . .] in all its ruthlessness and cruelty.

Lugemishuvi suurendamiseks:

The history of punishment, then, for Nietzsche, cannot be reduced to one thing and thought of broadly. Rather, one is forced to and can only speak of specific epochs or phases where punishment was said—and meant—to do specific things (the cross-sections of history Nietzsche utilizes). The most significant point that emerges from Nietzsche’s exposition of (excessive) pain and suffering, then, is the absurdity of speaking in broad and reductive language.

Ranasinghe, P. (2022). Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Criminology. Theoretical Criminology, 26(1), 75–90. https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480620977853