Patronaaž on sotsiaalse reaalsuse osa, mis ilmutab ennast sageli eeskätt valimiseelsetel perioodidel, kuigi tegu tundub olevat valdkonnaga, mida suur osa siiski väldib, sest … Ega täpselt ju ei teagi, miks soovitakse vältida. Siinviidatu pakub seletusi nii patronaaži püsimise kohta kui ka raamistiku patronaažiga tegelemiseks. Head uudistamist!
“Patronage appointments permit political leaders to populate their governments with officials who are loyal to them and their political parties. Patronage also permits those political leaders to bring talented people into government positions who might not want to spend their entire career in the public sector, whether because of relatively low pay, or other reasons (Panizza et al., 2019).” (Peters and Bianchi, 2022, p. 1)
Patronaaž on kohal ka seal, kus ehk ei ootaks:
“Despite that normative standard, many governments continue to maintain large numbers of patronage appointments, and there is some evidence of backsliding by merit systems, even in the most merit-based systems (Dahlström & Niklasson, 2013). Some of this backsliding is more subtle than patronage per se, but it has the same effect of politicizing the public bureaucracy (Peters & Pierre, 2004, 2023). Especially in the Central and Eastern European countries that developed merit systems conforming to international standards as part of the accession process to the European Union, there has been a significant movement back toward patronage (Kopecky et al., 2012; Peters, 2020).” (Peters and Bianchi, 2022, p. 1)
“This paper will first discuss the reasons why patronage is adopted and maintained, when so it has been so widely criticized by scholars, and by international organizations pressing for “good governance” in their donee states. With those explanations in mind, we will then discuss mechanisms through which patronage may be eliminated, or at least reduced. Identifying the mechanisms for reducing or eliminating patronage will provide the background for a dynamic performance governance model of patronage reduction (see Peters & Bianchi, 2020).” (Peters and Bianchi, 2022, p. 2)
“We are arguing (see below) that there is a fundamental difference between mass patronage that politicizes much or all of the administrative system, and more elite patronage that uses appointments as expert advisors, and political advisors, to assist political leaders in providing governance (Panizza et al., 2019).” (Peters and Bianchi, 2022, p. 2)
“The analysis carried out in this section has illustrated logical connections between variables associated with policies aimed at moving away from patronage. The usefulness of the model here discussed is related to the possibility to involve decisionmakers in a learning process aimed at perceiving the dynamic complexity of the feedback structures portrayed in Figure 1a and 1b. Such dynamic complexity involves the possibility that disappointing outcomes might follow in the long run over the achieved positive results in the short-medium term. It also implies that reforms aimed at enabling policies that might pursue sound societal outcomes in the long run might not be sustainable because of poor short-term results.” (Peters and Bianchi, 2022, p. 10)
Peters, B. G., & Bianchi, C. (2022). Moving Away from Patronage: A Feedback Approach. The American Review of Public Administration, 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1177/02750740221127050