Siinviidatud vabalevis olev tekst võib huvi pakkuda nendele, keda paeluvad keskkonna, organisatsiooni ja eetika küsimused. Dieselgate on eesti ajakirjanduses saanud küll mõningast tähelepanu, kuid kontekstuaalselt tundub, et see ikkagi on kuidagi võõras teema. Loodan, et eksin, aga minu tunnetus tõukub minuni ulatuvatest avaliku sektori organisatsioonide säästva ja kestliku arenguga seotud igapäevapraktikatest.

Siinviidatus on ülevaade nii autotootjate kasutatavatest praktikatest kestliku arengu kontekstis, rohepesust ja veidi avaramalt ka domineerivatest käitumismustritest.

Kontekstist:

The Dieselgate case is often considered one of the worst corporate scandals in recent decades (Bowen et al., 2018; Cârstea, 2016; Jung et al., 2017; Mujkic & Klingner, 2019). This scandal is mainly associated with the misconduct of a particular car manufacturer, namely Volkswagen (VW), which installed cheating software aimed at artificially reducing the measurement of pollutant emissions from its diesel vehicles by a drastic degree

… ei midagi erilist

However, numerous investigations carried out since 2015 have shown that, in addition to VW, most car manufacturers have also made extensive use of similar cheating software in order to fraudulently respond to the increasingly stringent regulations to reduce the polluting emissions of their vehicles (Chapman, 2016; Eigruber & Wirl, 2020; Ewing & Granville, 2019; Schmitt, 2017).

Autorite eesmärk:

The main objective of this article is to analyze the major types of neutralization techniques used in car manufacturers’ SRs when they discuss the Dieselgate scandal, and how these techniques have evolved over time.

Dieselgate ei ole midagi uut:

Dieselgate emerged within a historical, technological, and institutional context that facilitated the emergence of cheating behavior in the measurement of vehicle emissions (He & Jin, 2017; Walgren, 2000; Zhang et al., 2021). Thus, these behaviors are far from being new. For example, in 1995, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) required General Motors to pay a $45 million fine for installing software to minimize the recording of carbon monoxide emissions on Cadillac cars (Cushman, 1995; Walgren, 2000). […] the Dieselgate case no longer concerns only VW but now extends to the vast majority of the main car manufacturers.

Rohepesul võib olla seletusi:

The widespread use of these cheating behaviors can be explained by the endemic trend toward corporate greenwashing (Aurand et al., 2018; Boiral, 2013; Bowen & Aragon-Correa, 2014; Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Siano et al., 2017), by growing institutional pressures to reduce the environmental impacts of organizations at a lower cost (Brønn & Vidaver-Cohen, 2009; Delmas & Toffel, 2004; Testa, Boiral, et al., 2018), and by the mimetic isomorphism—or the tendency to imitate the practices of other organizations exposed to similar institutional pressures—that characterizes disclosure practices in this area (Gürtürk & Hahn, 2016; MartínezFerrero & García-Sánchez, 2017; Smith et al., 2011).

Mõned praktikad:

New techniques such as the “defense of necessity,” “victimization,” “appeal to good character,” and “the claim of normality” (Bryant et al., 2018; Coleman, 1994; Conklin, 2007) have been added to the five techniques originally identified by Sykes and Matza in 1957 (denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victims, appeal to higher loyalties, and condemnation of condemners).

Sarnased praktika kontekstuaalselt erinevates tingimustes:

For GMC and Porsche, the adoption of a “wait and see” configuration takes place under very different conditions. For GMC, the 2015 SR is in a “head in the sand” logic and does not clearly mention Dieselgate. However, GMC’s 2016 SR uses the logic of “self-proclaimed green leadership” characterized by a strong commitment to meet regulations, particularly for its subsidiary Opel. Following a series of investigations and complaints (Boudette, 2015), the manufacturer subsequently adopts a very defensive, even aggressive position, particularly in 2017: “A list due to reputational risks related to charges of alleged misreporting diesel emissions for certain models in the U.S., which GM strongly disputes. These claims are baseless and we will vigorously defend ourselves” (GMC, 2017, p. 25).

Järeldused on järeldused. Analüütilised. Elu- ja moraalse keskkonna aspektist ei ole põhjust väga rõõmustada:

The present study shows that, even when these unethical behaviors are clearly proven by independent investigations, corporate disclosure practices continue to be obscured by greenwashing tendencies and are not really used as a vehicle to recognize past wrongdoings or to present a more balanced image of sustainability performance.

Boiral, O., Brotherton, M.-C., Yuriev, A., & Talbot, D. (2021). Through the Smokescreen of the Dieselgate Disclosure: Neutralizing the Impacts of a Major Sustainability Scandal. Organization & Environment. https://doi.org/10.1177/10860266211043561