Kes küll võiks huvi tunda politseimudelite vastu? Võib-olla need, kes huvituvad politsei võimekusest tegeleda ühiskonnas turvalisusprobleemidega. Põhjuseid võib veelgi olla.

Siinviidatud vabalevis olev tekst leidis oma koha peamiselt põhjusel, et mõtestab politseimudeleid sünteesi ja ühisosa, mitte ajaloolisest või nullsummamängi perspektiivist. Tõsi, tekstis näitavad autorid ka seda, kuidas toimub n-ö mudelite konkurents ja kuidas ühe mudeli piirid võimaldavad teise mudeli võimekusel esile pääseda.

Kontekstiks proaktiivsest politseist:

“Proactive policing is a strategy which has been adopted by many law enforcement agencies across the country since the early 1990s (Hoover, Zhang, Wells, Ren, & Zhao, 2016; Telep & Weisburd, 2012). Proactive policing tends to be heavily place-oriented, and the practice is broadly seen as an effective way to control crime and address disorder in the U.S (Braga, Welsh, & Schnell, 2015; Telep & Weisburd, 2012; Zhao, He, & Lovrich, 2003).” (Zhao and Zhang, 2022, p. 1)

Kasulik viide politseimudelite piiridele ja teisenemisele:

“The pre-existing professional model of policing is often labeled as reactive in nature and features the police taking a narrow focus on crime incidents and the arrest and successful prosecution of offenders (Cordner, 1998; Kelling & Moore, 1988). In contrast, proactive policing can be viewed as devoting particular attention to broad and multiple channels of police engagement in the local community they serve (Hoover et al., 2016; Zhao et al., 2003).” (Zhao and Zhang, 2022, p. 1)

Autorid seavad eesmärgi:

“The purpose of this study is to fill this important void by examining the geographic locations selected for proactive policing activities by both ordinary patrol officers and disorder policing officers.” (Zhao and Zhang, 2022, p. 2)

Hot-spot policing teiste sõnadega:

“In disorder policing practice, law enforcement agencies disproportionally deploy officers in geographic locations where disorder crimes are the highest, and they employ a combination of problem solving skills, outreach programs, and environmental redesign methods to suppress the occurrence of disorder crime (Greene, 2000; Wilson & Kelling, 1982).” (Zhao and Zhang, 2022, p. 2)

Professionaalse politseimudeli juured:

“The theoretical framework in the professional model is largely borrowed from classic deterrence theory (Ehrlich, 1973; Kelling & Moore, 1988). It is assumed that preventive patrol activities, particularly when carried out randomly, can deliver a deterrent effect and prevent crime incidents from happening (Cordner, 1998; Greene, 2000).” (Zhao and Zhang, 2022, p. 2)


“The research site of this study is Houston, Texas, the fourth largest city in the U.S. featuring a population of 2.3 million inhabitants. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the violent crime rate per 100,000 population in Houston in 2019 (1072 per 100,000 population) was higher than in most U.S. large cities, including New York City (571), Chicago (943), and Los Angeles (732).” (Zhao and Zhang, 2022, p. 4)

Lugemishuvi suurendamiseks:

“We have argued here that differences in theoretical standpoints and sources of information collected would likely lead to differences in proactive geographic selections made by ordinary patrol officers and DRT officers. It is expected that officers operating under a community policing model will emphasize different strategies and activities than officers operating under a professional model of policing.” (Zhao and Zhang, 2022, p. 8)

Zhao, J. S., & Zhang, Y. (2022). Proactive policing embedded in two models: A geospatial analysis of proactive activities by patrol officers and COP officers. Journal of Criminal Justice82, 1–12.

Siinviidatu võiks huvi pakkuda suurele hulgale lugejatele alates politseinikest kuni poliitikakujundajateni, kuid ka näiteks lapsevanematele või abikaasadele, kes võivad kokku puutuda võimalike narko- või alkojoobes autojuhtidega. Erilise pühendumisega võiks teksti lugeda kõik ennetushuvilised, sest artikkel pakub väga kasuliku ja avara ülevaate-mõtestamise teoreetilistest aspektidest ennetustööks.


“Over 20 per cent of fatalities across the globe (including but not limited to Australia, Canada, Austria, Cambodia, Norway, United States, United Kingdom) have been attributed to drink driving (International Transport Forum, 2017). More recently, in Queensland, Australia (where this study took place), over 22 per cent of fatalities in 2020 were attributed to drink driving motorists (Queensland Government, 2022). […] In terms of drug driving, it has been reported that over 15 per cent of Australian drivers’ have driven under the influence of drugs (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2017). Further, in Queensland between 2011 and 2015, 48 per cent of road crash fatalities had illicit drugs detected in their system (Davey et al., 2020).” (Truelove et al., 2022, p. 2)

Heidutus on tuntud vahend, aga …

“Deterrence theory has typically been used to examine how legal enforcement and punishment can influence engagement in offending behaviour. The perceived certainty of apprehension has been considered the most important component of classical deterrence theory (Beccaria, 1764/ 2007) and has regularly been suggested to be the most important contributor in deterrence research (Homel, 1988; Nagin et al., 2015; Piquero et al., 2011).” (Truelove et al., 2022, p. 3)

Teadlik rikkumine, kuid karistusest hoidumine on oluline faktor ennustamaks:

“Specifically, committing an offence but avoiding punishment has been found to be one of the most influential factors in the continuation of offending behaviour due to weakening individuals’ perceptions of the certainty of being apprehended for the offence (Stafford & Warr, 1993), and this variable has been found to be a strong predictor for both drink driving (e.g., Freeman & Watson, 2006) and drug driving (Armstrong et al., 2018; Watling et al., 2010).” (Truelove et al., 2022, p. 3)

Heidutuse laiendamine:

“Homel (1988) expanded on deterrence theory to create a deterrence-based model that incorporates the non-legal sanctions of 1) the threat of physical loss to oneself (i.e., I might get hurt) and to others (i.e., someone else might get hurt), 2) the threat of internal loss (i.e., I might feel guilty), and 3) the threat of social loss (i.e., my friends/family might judge me).” (Truelove et al., 2022, p. 4)

Millega oleks kasulik arvestada joobes juhtimise ennetamise kavandamisel:

“Taken together, drivers were found to perceive the threat of legal and non-legal deterrents to be greater for drink driving than drug driving. Moreover, avoiding punishment for drug driving was more common than for drink driving.” (Truelove et al., 2022, p. 13)

Lugemishuvi suurendamiseks:

“While there were many similarities between the two (most likely due to the similar enforcement method that is used for both behaviours), the most prominent differences that emerged involved the significant deterrent effect of the perceived certainty of apprehension and severity of punishment for drug driving that was not evident for drink driving.” (Truelove et al., 2022, p. 15)

Truelove, V., Davey, B., & Watson-Brown, N. (2022). Examining the differences in perceived legal and non-legal factors between drink driving and drug driving. Journal of Criminology, 1–19.

Parempopulismi edusammud on märgata, kuid millise tähenduse võiks need saada karistamise sotsioloogilisest perspektiivist, see võiks huvi pakkuda väga paljudele. Sestap siinviidatud vabalevis olev tekst oma koha leidiski.

Kontekstiks parempopulismi edusammud Euroopas:

“Some of the biggest advances have been made in central and eastern Europe where far-right parties have now come to power and established autocratic regimes. With the vote share of populist parties in national elections for European countries now at its highest level since the early 1990s (Rooduijn et al., 2019), this populist ‘explosion’ (Judis, 2016) is widely regarded as a very real and grave threat to democracy in general, and the rights of minorities in particular.” (Hamilton, 2022, p. 2)

Vihast tõukuv retoorika:

“As Loader (2018: 7) puts it, ‘criminologists have, after all, been engaged for some time with problems that are animated by angerfuelled populism and authoritarian rhetoric’.” (Hamilton, 2022, p. 2)

Autor seab eesmärgi:

“This article takes stock of the existing literature on this phenomenon with a view to proposing a tentative criminological research agenda that may contribute to our understanding of the recent rise of authoritarian politics in Europe, the UK and US.” (Hamilton, 2022, p. 2)

Arengud kriminoloogias:

“Of course, criminological writing has moved on considerably since the heyday of ‘penal populism’ and the ‘new punitiveness’ (Pratt et al., 2005), with many scholars rejecting such concepts as ‘totalising trends’ (Aaronson, 2022), and Pratt (2008) himself acknowledging the limits of penal populism.” (Hamilton, 2022, p. 3)

Karistamise mõjususest:

“Arguing that the connection between ‘hostile solidarity’, insecurity and identity can aid in understanding the recent rise of authoritarian politics in Europe and the US, their work (and that of others such as Hӧrnqvist, 2021) examines the ‘emotional release’, ‘pleasure’ and sense of belonging that comes through the act of punishing.” (Hamilton, 2022, p. 5)

Populistlik poliitika erineb tavalisest

“As Canovan (1984, 1999) has observed, populist politics is not politics as usual. There is a mood, ‘an extra emotional ingredient’ (Canovan, 1999: 6), that draws even normally unpolitical people into the political arena. ‘Security populism’ is not any different in this regard with emotions long considered an integral part of the experience of insecurity (Van Rythoven, 2015).” (Hamilton, 2022, p. 11) …

Lugemishuvi suurendamiseks:

“Tempting as it is to herald ‘the end of reason’ (Pratt and Miao, 2017) and retreat into ‘left melancholia’ (Brown, 1999), such a moralising approach misses much about why and how security became a core theme within contemporary populist politics (Hogg, 2021) while reinforcing the idea of far-right supporters as the ‘others’ of society.” (Hamilton, 2022, p. 15)

Hamilton, C. (2022). Radical right populism and the sociology of punishment: Towards a research agenda. Punishment & Society, 1–21.

Kui kõneldakse juhtidest mingis valdkonnas, siis sageli jääb mulje, et tegemist on justkui kõikidele arusaadava üldistusastmega. Ometi võivad juhtide isikud ja nende juhtimispraktikad reljeefselt erineda. Sestap see artikkel siin oma koha leidis. Tekst võiks huvi pakkuda nii politseinikele kui kõikidele organisatsioonihuvilistele.


“Occupational culture research, however, has focused primarily on line-level officers as few studies have considered cultural orientations across rank (cf., Engel, 2001; Manning, 1994; Reuss-Ianni, 1983), especially at the chief-level. As top leaders, chiefs influence official organizational culture and officer cultural adherence by the priorities they emphasize and the policies they set (Jermier et al., 1991; Wilson, 1968).” (Ingram et al., 2022, p. 2)

Andmed ja eesmärgid:

“Using survey data from 460 police chiefs, the current study serves two purposes. First, we examine chiefs’ views on the importance of four key aspects of the contemporary police role: law enforcement, order maintenance, community policing, and procedural justice. […] The second purpose is to identify relevant demographic, department, and jurisdictional correlates of group membership.” (Ingram et al., 2022, p. 2)

Kolm politsei traditsioonilist rolli:

“Historically, there have been three primary roles relevant to police occupational culture: law enforcement, order maintenance, and service.” (Ingram et al., 2022, p. 2)

Politseikultuuri mõjutavad organisatsioonivälised faktorid:

“Finally, police culture studies have also speculated that external environmental features such as jurisdictional socioeconomic and demographic composition, as well as levels of crime/disorder may account for cultural variation (Cordner, 2017; Paoline, 2001).” (Ingram et al., 2022, p. 7)

Senine kogemus on valdavalt ühelt tasandilt ja valdkonnast:

“In conclusion, the study of police occupational culture has garnered a considerable amount of (quantitative) empirical attention over the last 25 years, the vast majority of which has occurred among entry-level patrol officers (Paoline & Terrill, 2014).” (Ingram et al., 2022, p. 22)

Lugemishuvi suurendamiseks:

“From a practical perspective, our findings shed light on the prioritization of role orientations among those responsible for shaping the culture of organizations.” (Ingram et al., 2022, p. 21)

Ingram, J. R., Paoline, E. A., Rockwell, A. R., & Azimi, A. M. (2022). Police Chief Culture: A View From the Top. Police Quarterly, 1–29.

Politsei edukus on ennustatav muuhulgas legitiimsuse aspektist. Kõrge legitiimsus elanike hulgas on eelduseks nii adekvaatse info adekvaatseks liikumiseks kui võimaldab manööverdamist ja eksimusi. Siinviidatud vabalevis olev tekst võiks huvi pakkuda kõikidele politseihuvilistele.

Legitiimsuse tuum demokraatias:

“Central to the legitimacy of democratic regimes is the consent of the governed, the idea that institutional structures reflect the collective will of the people. Absent that consent, governments cannot expect compliance with law or any other forms of recognition of legitimate authority.” (Bunnell, 2022, p. 1)

Politsei legitiimsuskriisis:

“However, policing institutions currently face a global legitimacy crisis. Activists and grassroots organizations, including, notably, the Black Lives Matter movement, have organized for generations against pervasive policing practices steeped in traditions of institutional discrimination and militarized violence.” (Bunnell, 2022, p. 2)


“The research focuses on the question of how the concepts of police accountability, popular consent, and legitimacy were related in the public discourse throughout the reform implementation process.” (Bunnell, 2022, p. 2)


“Finally, I assessed and reflected upon the quantitative and qualitative findings to glean insights regarding the evolution of reports about the police. Traditionally, “content analysis sees messages as coded representations of the real world, fixed and knowable” (Bertrand & Hughes, 2005, p. 174), and, indeed, the analysis treats print media as representations of militant nationalist public opinion.” (Bunnell, 2022, p. 10)

Politsei edukus on ennustatav:

“The issue of democratic legitimacy lies at the heart of these discussions regarding police reform and the development of just and effective policing. Police effectiveness is predicated upon public support and cooperation, and this support is inextricably tied to public perceptions of the force’s legitimacy; indeed, the primary reason members of the public cooperate with the police is their acceptance of the police as legitimate legal authorities (Tyler, 2004).” (Bunnell, 2022, p. 21)

Lugemishuvi suurendamiseks:

“The establishment of effective accountability mechanisms was crucial, not only because it accompanied a boost in indicators of legitimacy, but also because such mechanisms promoted police accountability to a prominent position in public discourse and facilitated the political prioritization of police reform.” (Bunnell, 2022, p. 22)

Bunnell, E. K. (2022). Advancing Representation Theory to Reflect the Police Reform Process in Post-Troubles West Belfast. International Criminal Justice Review, 1–27.

Kas kujutlused ideaalsed politseist on asjakohased? Siinviidatud vabalevis olev tekst võiks olla kohustuslikuks kirjanduseks kõikidele politseinikele ja politseivaldkonna korraldajatele.


“For the most part, social and political philosophers have concerned themselves with three major institutions: economic systems, democratic systems of decision-making, and families.1 I argue here that institutions of enforcement, especially the police, are entitled to the status of “major” institution, even within the realm of ideal theory.” (Monaghan, 2022, p. 1)

Võimas avaldus, mille vastu on keeruline vaielda:

“Much of the developed world is now characterized by “government by policing” in the sense that our day-to-day is substantially determined by police action (Seo 2019). […] In particular, I’ll argue that the need for a certain kind of policing—“order maintenance policing”—survives methodologically attractive idealizations, and the supposition that ideal theory obviates the police comes from an overly narrow construal of the police as “law enforcers.”” (Monaghan, 2022, p. 2)

Moraalsed inglid …

“Whether we imagine individuals as fully compliant (or at least disposed to conditionally comply) with the rules of society or more strongly idealized as “moral angels” who are always highly motivated to do the right thing and work together peacefully and cooperatively, ideal theory typically posits no active role for the enforcement or administration of justice in society.” (Monaghan, 2022, p. 2)

Autor väidab:

“The claim in this paper is that philosophically interesting and methodologically attractive idealizations do not exclude policing, or some kind of agency that enforces or administers justice, from the set of major institutions.” (Monaghan, 2022, p. 2)

Olulise institutsiooni kolm eeltingumust:

“There are three criteria for an institution to count as major: they must (i) determine the kinds of lives we can live and (ii) produce deep inequalities that (iii) are not justified by merit or desert.” (Monaghan, 2022, p. 3)

Politseipraktikad võivad luua ebaõiglust:

“Second, law enforcement produces significant inequalities. For instance, interactions with police officers significantly affect individual well-being. Interactions with police can produce trauma and anxiety. More frequent, intrusive, or aggressive interactions, unsurprisingly, result in higher levels of trauma and anxiety (Geller et al. 2014).” (Monaghan, 2022, p. 4)

Seadusekuulekas olla on väga keeruline:

“Crucially, traffic violations arise even when motorists intend to follow the law. This is because, for one, perfect driving is difficult. It is also because traffic infrastructure often encourages illegal driving even in courteous and conscientious motorists.” (Monaghan, 2022, p. 6)

Vildakas eeldus:

“There’s a common mistake in ideal theorizing about justice: assume that individuals in their private roles are non-ideal while assuming that in their public roles they’re ideal and derive conclusions about just institutional structures from this assumption (Freiman 2017).” (Monaghan, 2022, p. 7)

Lugemishuvi suurendamiseks:

“The point of this illustration is that thinking about ideally just policing requires thinking “defensively” about the problems we are likely to encounter, ones that persist even in the face of various idealizations.” (Monaghan, 2022, p. 13)

Monaghan, J. (2022). Idealizations and ideal policing. Philosophers’ Imprint, 22, 1–15.

Aruandekohuslus, läbipaistvus jms võiks olla midagi avalike organisatsioonide esindajatele iseenesestmõistetavat, kui mõelda õiglustunde loomisele. Ometi on inimesi, kes on politsei suhtes umbusklikud ning oleks jultunud väita, et neil selleks põhjust ei ole. Siinviidatu võiks huvi pakkuda väga suurele lugejaskonnale, sest puudutab tundlikke avaliku elu tahke.

Kontekstiks – keegi saab rohkem tähelepanu, kui keegi teine

“Ethnic minority men often feel that the police suspect them of criminal activities (Sharp and Atherton 2007; Haller et al. 2020b; Saarikkomäki et al. 2021), and they report being targets of officers’ micro harassments (Haller et al. 2020a) and excessive use of force (Fassin 2013; Novich and Hunt 2017). Ethnic minority youth are thus key targets of what has been described as ‘the police gaze’ (Finstad 2000).” (Søgaard et al., 2022, p. 1)

Vahendid ja kanalid on olulised:

“Once on the internet, officers’ (mis)conduct become accessible to large heterogeneous audiences, such as the general public, police administration and prosecutors, who can now be made aware of, and make moral and sometimes even legal assessment of officers’ actions (Schaefer and Steinmetz 2014).” (Søgaard et al., 2022, p. 2)

Artikli piiritlemine:

“little research exists on non-organised/non-activist ethnic minority young people’s use cell phone cameras in their everyday encounters with the police. Against this background, this paper draws on 37 interviews from Denmark to explore the multifaceted nature of marginalised ethnic minority young people’s use of cell phone cameras.” (Søgaard et al., 2022, p. 2)

“Pilk” ei ole kunagi neutraalne, vaid osa võimusuhetest:

“Inspired by Foucault’s assertion that ‘the gaze’ is never neutral, but rather embedded in power-relations and productions of ‘truths’ (1977), scholars have argued that the current pervasiveness of cell phone cameras and social media is challenging traditional police–citizen power-relations (Goldsmith 2010; Wall and Linnemann 2014).” (Søgaard et al., 2022, p. 3)

Filmimine iseenesest ei pruugi täita temale pandud ootust (õigustust):

“Consequently, increased citizen filming does not automatically result in increased police accountability. Rather, the situation today seems to be that the filming of officers has become a key component in ongoing power struggles between the police and citizens.” (Søgaard et al., 2022, p. 3)

Filmijate erineva profiilid:

“While some videos are recorded by self-identified accountability activists, many are produced by ‘ordinary’ young minority men approached by the police, or by bystanders who happen to be present during a police stop or arrest.” (Søgaard et al., 2022, p. 4)

Vabadus salvestada ja jagada:

“In Denmark, the law does not prohibit citizens from filming officers in public spaces, as long as this does not obstruct the work of officers. Also, there is no law prohibiting citizens from uploading videos of officers on the internet, as long as these do not contain sensitive personal information.” (Søgaard et al., 2022, p. 4)


“Similar to other types of cultural resistance enacted by marginalised young men (Bourgois 2003; Jensen 2011), the making, sharing and watching of these police videos can engender a sense of agency and empowerment in opposition to the power of the police institution.” (Søgaard et al., 2022, p. 10)

Lugemishuvi suurendamiseks:

“While the fight for the (continued) right to film the police is important, it would be a mistake to assume that citizens’ filming can serve as a technological ‘fix’ to the problem of ethnic profiling and police maltreatment of ethnic minorities.” (Søgaard et al., 2022, p. 14)

Søgaard, T. F., Kolind, T., Haller, M. B., Kammersgaard, T., & Hunt, G. (2022). ‘Filming Is Our Only Weapon Against the Police’: Ethnic Minorities and Police Encounters in the New Visibility Era. The British Journal of Criminology, 1–17.

Siinviidatud vabalevis olev tekst leidis oma koha peamiselt põhjusel, et näitab, kuidas karistuse tähendus ja eesmärgid on ajas muutunud ning esitab ka põhjused, kuid ühtlasi vastustab ja seab kahtluse alla mitmeid tuntud aksioome. Tekst võiks huvi pakkuda kõikidele turvalisushuvilistele, kuid eeskätt ehk politseinikele ja poliitikakujundajatele.


“Crime prevention programmes, we are told, are the result of leftist and centrist parties adapting to the neoliberal environment, which has limited their policy options (Crawford, 2001; Hughes, 2002; McLaughlin, 2002; Pitts, 2001). […] Centrally, these studies of ‘neoliberal penality’ and ‘pre-crime’ rest upon a contrast with a previous era of ‘penal welfarism’ (Garland, 1985b, 2002).” (Heath-Kelly and Shanaáh, 2022, p. 358)

Küsimused ootavad vastust:

“In detailing this international criminological history, the article questions many assumptions made in Criminology about: (1) the strict separation of eras of ‘penal welfarism’ and ‘neoliberal penality’, especially concerning claims made about the emergence of pre-crime and prevention-oriented criminal justice in the neoliberal era; and (2) the presentation of a recent ‘securitization’ of criminal justice.” (Heath-Kelly and Shanaáh, 2022, p. 359)

David Garlandi panus:

“Centrally, Garland has identified the political and economic transformations which informed the shift from classical penality to penal welfarism in the UK, and then from penal welfarism to neoliberal penality. He shows that criminal justice in the Victorian era reflected the dominant liberal economics of the time, centring the minimal state (which performed a ‘night watchman’ role to ensure only social stability and the stability of economic contracts—see also Zedner, 2009) and conceptions of the individual as a freely choosing, rational actor […] Finally, completing the account of how penality maps onto political and economic shifts, Garland tracks the rise of ‘social control’ as the dominant frame for penality in the era of neoliberal economics—transforming the understanding of offenders, and crime, into the realms of opportunity reduction, actuarial prediction and the ‘responsibilization’ of sub-state and private actors for crime control.” (Heath-Kelly and Shanaáh, 2022, p. 360)

Sotsiaalkaitse ja ÜRO algatus:

“The UN founded a Social Defence section to lead on international crime policy in 1946, with the objectives of preventing crime through progressive social policy measures, establishing human rights informed standards for prisoners and directing penal policy towards the effective rehabilitation of offenders.” (Heath-Kelly and Shanaáh, 2022, p. 365)

Lugemishuvi suurendamiseks:

“While Anglophone states have recently retreated from rehabilitation-oriented criminal justice towards a more retributive footing, and while the development of statistical risk-assessment tools have accelerated the move from postcrime to pre-crime approaches, the history of international criminological forums demonstrates the longstanding presence of pre-crime ontology throughout the post-war era. […] Crime prevention fora at the international level fundamentally exceeded the remit of ‘categorization’ and ‘individualization of punishments’, remaining convinced (alapositivism and ‘old’ Social Defence) that crime’s environmental and social causes could be identified and that societies (and individuals) could be engineered to prevent future offences.” (Heath-Kelly and Shanaáh, 2022, p. 372)

Heath-Kelly, C., & Shanaáh, Š. (2022). The long history of prevention: Social Defence, security and anticipating future crimes in the era of ‘penal welfarism.’ Theoretical Criminology26(3), 357–376.

Politseinike koolitusprogrammid on riigiti üsna erinevad, kuid muutuvad n-ö suurtes klubides (nt EL) ikka sarnasemaks jäädes siiski kultuuri ja riigispetsiifiliseks.Küsimus sellest, mis on töötavad praktikad politseikoolituses, võiks huvi pakkuda paljudele.


“Across the globe, police agencies invest an immense amount of time and resources in training their officers. The various training programs are considered the most important tool police agencies have for reaching the ethical and professional standards expected of them in democratic societies (Chan et al., 2003; COPS Office, 2015; Goldstein, 1977; Haberfeld et al., 2011; Manning, 2010; Reiner, 2010), and, accordingly, training has been treated as a key feature in police reforms that seek to make officers more effective and fair (e.g., Edwards, 1993; Reiner, 1992).” (Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2022, p. 2)

Fookuse täpsustamine:

“Over the last decade, more and more rigorous studies examining the outcomes of various police training interventions have been published (Bennett et al., 2020; Nagin & Telep, 2020). At the same time, they have not developed from a consistent theoretical framework that allows us to consider them jointly as a coherent body of knowledge. Without such a framework in the background, it is difficult to understand why specific programs worked (or did not work), or what specific elements of the program made it more (or less) effective (Fraser et al., 2009; Weisburd et al., 2015).” (Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2022, p. 2)

Autorid seavad eesmärgi:

“Our goal is to provide a succinct description of the GET model and the process by which it was developed [a detailed description can be found in Litmanovitz (2016)], and examine the outcomes of a training intervention designed based on the model — a procedural justice (PJ) training module in the National Police College (NPC) in Israel.” (Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2022, p. 3)

Vihje metoodikale:

“As an “ecological” model (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998), it recognizes that the success (or failure) of training interventions are intertwined with the different realms in which police officers work and learn. The GET model (Litmanovitz, 2016) is made up of seven mechanisms nested within three domains (detailed below).” (Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2022, p. 5)

Kasutatavast mudelist:

“As suggested by the above review, the GET model provides a unique, comprehensive, evidence-informed “recipe” for what effective police training interventions should look like.” (Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2022, p. 8)

Lugemishuvi suurendamiseks:

“In turn, training interventions should be developed based on the best available scientific evidence on what works in police training. […] The findings of the present study suggest that the application of the GET model proposed by Litmanovitz (2016) for what should work in police training shows promise, and we expect that the model would prove highly useful to police researchers and practitioners in developing training interventions and testing their outcomes.” (Jonathan-Zamir et al., 2022, p. 19)

Jonathan-Zamir, T., Litmanovitz, Y., & Haviv, N. (2022). What Works in Police Training? Applying an Evidence-Informed, General, Ecological Model of Police Training. Police Quarterly, 10986111221113976.

Allan Y Jiao on üks autoritest, kelle publikatsioone võiks iga politseihuviline vähemalt sirvida. Siinviidatu leidis oma koha muuhulgas põhjusel, et fokuseerib politseistrateegiatele, mis on nii politsei kui organisatsiooni aspektist oluline.


“To maintain public safety and reduce gun violence, it is important to understand the effectiveness of various strategies used to address gun crimes that occur on a daily basis. This review thus excludes studies focused on mass shootings.” (Jiao, 2022, p. 1)

Varasemad uuringud soovitavad peamiselt kahte strateegiat: probleemipõhise politsei ja kogukonnakeskse politsei strateegiat.

“The previous reviews suggest predominantly two types of police strategies for addressing gun crimes, that is, problem-oriented policing (Braga and Weisburd, 2015; Koper and Mayo-Wilson, 2006; National Research Council, 2005; Sherman, 2001) and community policing (Fagan, 2002; International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2011; Makarios and Pratt, 2012; Redding and Shalf, 2001).” (Jiao, 2022, p. 2)


“The current review, by including a variety of studies, addresses the question, are two types of strategies and related theories sufficient for understanding policing gun crimes?” (Jiao, 2022, p. 3)

Andmete kogumisest:

“A key-word search was performed in ten electronic databases, that is, Criminal Justice Abstract, Criminal Justice Database, Social Science Database, Sociological Abstracts, Sociology Database, Medline, Legal Information Reference Center, Policy File Index, Public Health Database, and Google Scholar with different combinations of the following search terms: “police,”“law enforcement,”“gun,” “firearm,”“gun crime,”“gun violence,” and “risk.”” (Jiao, 2022, p. 3)


“Since this review is focused on research articles on police strategies dealing with daily gun crimes, articles on police use of guns, police-involved gun incidents, gun assaults on police, police gun training, lack of cooperation during gun incidents, police-race dynamics involving guns, police and gun laws, broad gun control legislations, mass shootings, and terrorism topics were excluded.” (Jiao, 2022, p. 3)

Lähemale analüüsile:

“Police strategies were classified into eight categories such as focused deterrence, directed uniformed patrols, comprehensive approach, situational/routine activities, and professional law enforcement. These strategies were then identified or described as effective, ineffective, or not evaluated according to results presented in the original studies.” (Jiao, 2022, p. 3)

Lugemishuvi suurendamiseks:

“Different from previous reviews focused predominantly on targeted patrols and focused deterrence and occasionally on community/comprehensive approach, this review based on forty-three studies has led to two other orientations in policing gun crimes, most notably the situational/routine activity perspectives and, to a lesser extent, the tech-driven law enforcement model.” (Jiao, 2022, p. 12-13)

Jiao, A. Y. (2022). Policing gun crimes: A comprehensive review of strategies and effectiveness. The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles, 1–17.